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OF AMOUNT OF SPECIAL
TEE PLEAmms-Two plaintiffs instituted actions against

PLEADING-SPECIAL DAMAGEs-STATEMENT
DAMAGES iN

defendant for injuries sustained by them while riding as guests in
defendant's car. Plaintiff Stamper's complaint recited that medical
expenses and loss of time resulted from injuries sustained in the accident. The respective amounts claimed for these special damages
were not stated, there being an overall prayer for $10,000. Stamper
received judgment for $4,000 in the trial court. A major question upon
appeal, as stated by the Court was,
[Wihether or not CR 9.06 requires a party not only to state the nature
of his claimed special damages but also the amount thereof.

The Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered a new
trial upon the grounds of erroneous instructions, but Held: That
failure to state the special damages in the amount in the pleadings does
not foreclose proof and recovery of such item. Two judges dissented.
Lee v. Stamper, 300 S.W. 2d 251 (Ky. 1957).
Damages for purposes of this comment are those damages which

are "actual and compensatory", in that they measure loss or detriment
to a plaintiff. Such actual damages are of two types, general damages
and special damages.
...If the damages result necessarily from the injury or wrong complained of, they are called 'general damages', and will be embraced
by the general statement of the facts and the demand of relief; but if
such damages be the natural, although not the necessary, result of
such injury . . . they are termed 'special damages' and must be

specially stated in the petition.1

While the above distinction might seem artificial, the practical
requirements of pleading and notice have induced the courts to

generally adopt the distinction and require that instances of special
damages be specifically alleged and stated apart from items of general
damages.2 While certain damages might readily be expected to result
from a wrongful act, other instances of damages might follow from the
existence of exterior factors peculiarly within the knowledge of the
injured party. In the latter case, if the defendant is to be apprised

of what he must meet, he must necessarily be informed of the existence
of such extraordinary circumstances. There seems no better time to
inform him of such factors than during the pleading stage. The need

for such information is obvious, and that need is provided for in
Rule 9.06 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure which requires
'Newman, Pleadings 438, quoted in Louisville &N. R. Co. v. Roney, 82 Ky.
L. Rep. 1326, 108 S.W. 343 (1908).
2 15 Am. Jur., Damages sec. 805 (1938).
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that "When items of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically pleaded."
A question arises, however, whether the plaintiff should not only
plead the nature of the special damages received, but also the amount
to which he deems himself entitled. Some courts considering the
question have held that items of special damage such as loss of time
3
and medical expenses must be expressed in terms of dollars and cents.
Other courts have held that, so long as the nature of the special damage
4
is alleged, the amount need not be stated.
Under the code practice, Kentucky courts were very diligent in
their application of the rule that the plaintiff must state the amount
as well as the nature of such damages. 5 The leading case in this series
is Jesse v. Shuck.6 In that case the Court held that an allegation of
special damages (medical expenses) in which the amount was left
blank amounted to no allegation of special damages and afforded no
basis for a judgment as to that allegation.
In the Shuck case and the cases that followed, the Court advanced
two reasons for the rule: 1) Notice. The amount of damages should
be stated so as to insure that the defendant will receive notice of the
extent of recovery desired so that he might prepare his evidence and
assemble witnesses to refute any claims over and above what he
thinks the plaintiff is entitled to.7 2) Admission. A statement of the
amount of damage will give the defendant an opportunity to either
admit or deny the averment.8 This, it was reasoned, would dispose of
certain issues of special damages in those cases in which the defendant
is willing to admit the accuracy of that averment.
The question arises whether the above justifications for the rule

are valid under the new rules. To resolve this, it is necessary to discuss
the above justifications in light of the theory of modem pleading.
3 Griffin v. Russel, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10, L.R.A. 1916 F. 216 (1915);
Neville v. Mitchell, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 89, 66 S.W. 579 (1902); Young v. Howell,
236 S.W.
2d 247 (Tex. 1951).
4
Turney v. Southern Pac. Co., 44 Or. 280, 75 P. 144 (1904)- Detrich v.

Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 125 Mo. App. 608, 102 S.W. 1044 (1907j; Shown v.

Taylor, 88 N.E. 2d 783 (Ind. 1949); Olson v. Johnson, 267 Wis. 462, 66 N.W.
2d 346 (1954).
5 Lexington & E. Ry. Co. v. Fields, 152 Ky. 19, 153 S.W. 43 (1913); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Moore, 150 Ky. 692, 150 S.W. 849 (1912); Blue Grass Traction Co. v. Ingles, 140 Ky. 488, 131 S.W. 278 (1910); Lexington Ry. Co. v. Britton
130 Ky. 676, 114 S.W. 295 (1908); Jesse v. Shuck, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 463, 12 S.W.
304 (1889).
611 Ky. L. Rep. 463, 12 S.W. 304 (1889).
7 Ibid.
s Lexington Ry. Co. v. Britton, 130 Ky. 676, 684, 114 S.W. 295, 297 (1908).
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1. Notice
Under the theory of the common law and code systems of pleading,
there was reasonable justification for requiring the amount of special
damages to be pleaded. Under those systems, the pleadings were
viewed as the chief means for narrowing the issues in the case, and
for notifying the defendant of exactly what facts he must controvert
upon trial of the case. However, under the new rules, the emphasis
has changed since those days of issue and fact pleading to a more general requirement of notice pleading. Such notice pleading only requires the plaintiff to inform the defendant of the general nature of the
claim against him, additional means having been provided whereby
the parties might obtain the related facts through the use of various
discovery procedures. Those discovery procedures are the pretrial
conference, deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatory,
production of documents, and written interrogatories to the parties. 9
Professor Moore, in referring to the use of the discovery procedures
as a method of obtaining facts not contained in the pleadings has
said,' 0
The Federal Rules, unlike the common law system of procedure, are
not grounded on the supposition that the pleadings are the only or
chief basis of preparation for trial. ... It is recognized that pleadings
have not been successful as a fact-sifting mechanism and that attempts to force them to serve that purpose have resulted only in making the pleadings increasingly complicated.

Thus, it would seem that, to require the statement of the amount of
special damages, would be contrary to the spirit of the new rules.
The Kentucky Court in the principal case recognized this and pointed
out that such information is readily available by use of the discovery
procedures. However, Judge Sims, dissenting, objected to the use of
discovery in such cases saying,'1
The defendant should not be required to go to the trouble and
expense of ascertaining by interrogatories or by discovery the amount
of specific damages plaintiff is seeking to recover from him, but the
duty is on plaintiff to set them out with certainty in his complaint as
he knows, or should know, what his special damages are.

This statement does not seem to consider that, even if the amount of
special damages is alleged in the complaint, the defendant will probably request, by interrogatory or other discovery process, an itemized
statement of the particular expenses incurred such as hospital bills,
9 Ky. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
10 4 Moore, Federal Practice 1012 (2d ed. 1951).
11 Lee v. Stamper, 300 S.W. 2d 251, 255 (Ky. 1957).
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anesthetics, medication, etc.12 A summation of such specific items reveals to the defendant the amount of the special damages actually
incurred. This would make a statement of the amount in the pleadings
unnecessary.
Even if the amount of damages is stated in the pleadings, the question arises whether such statement gives the defendant "notice" of the
amount of special damages plaintiff is seeking. The plaintiff will
customarily ask for more special damages than he expects to recover
to allow for damages that might arise after the commencement of the
action. This problem and its solution will be discussed later.
The use of such discovery procedures would seem to be the most
desirable method of obtaining the amounts of special damages sustained for two important reasons:
1. A rule requiring the plaintiff to state in his pleadings the amount
of his special damages could easily be extended to the point where an
infinitesimal itemization would be required. The spirit of the new
rules is to prevent such detailed and complicated pleadings, and discovery devices are provided for obtaining such evidentiary matter.
2. Their use would enable the defendant to obtain an accurate
statement of the amount of special damage sustained. An accurate
statement would be more likely to induce him to admit that issue and
thus dispose of it.
2. Admission
Since the plaintiff is limited in his recovery to the maximum amount
pleaded as special damages, 13 he will customarily frame his damages
in an amount far in excess of the actual amount he expects to recover
so as to allow for medical expenses and loss of time expected to arise
in the future. In fact, this practice has been urged upon the profession
by the Kentucky Court.14 Certainly, this would lessen the supposed
advantage to be gained from stipulating the amount of the special
damages in the pleadings. No defendant is willing to admit the truth
of an exaggerated statement of damages, so such statement must be
an accurate one. If the information is obtained by way of discovery
through use of the interrogatory to the parties, the added efficacy of
12
1n Heny Pratt Co. v. Stoody Co., 16 F.R.D. 175, 177 (1954) the
court required the plaintiff to state the amount of special damages incurred.
However, it refused to go further and require the plaintiff to set out the specific
items of expenses incurred, saying these were evidentiary matters which could be
obtained by discovery.
IsId. at 254.
14Blue Grass Traction Co. v. Ingles, 140 Ky. 488, 495, 181 S.W. 278, 281

(1910).
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the oath will insure an accurate statement of such amount. Further,
the interrogatory will usually request an itemized statement of such
expenses, which will further increase the chances that the issue will be
admitted since the itemized account may be easily checked.
This reasoning is not invalidated by the fact that, at the time of the
suit, certain special damages might not be accurately determinable.
It is enough to say that the response to the interrogatory will be verified only to the extent of damages and expenses incurred up to that
time. This statement will not foreclose recovery upon damages that
arise after the suit is started. Future damages, such as permanent disablement and loss of time and medical expenses expected to be incurred after the action is started will seldom, if ever, be the object of admission by the defendant. It is easy to see that this division of special
damages into present and future damages will enable defendant, if
he so desires, to admit that portion of the claim relating to present
damages and reject the remainder.
Conclusion
An examination of the requirement that special damages must be
stated in the amount makes it clear that the rule serves no practical
purpose. Such a statement gives the defendant neither notice of the
claim against him nor a practical opportunity to admit the truth of the
claim. It seems that the court reached the correct decision in light of
the compelling maxim that a rule without a reason is valueless.
Addenda
It would seem that the Court, had it chosen to do so, could have
avoided the damages question. It does not appear that the defendant
made any objection to the omission of the amount of special damages
in the trial court. If he felt himself prejudiced by the omission, he
had ample opportunity to move for more definite statement. If he
desired the information in good faith, he had several methods available
to him, through discovery, to obtain an accurate statement of the
damages. He should not be heard to say, on appeal, that he was
prejudiced by the failure to state the amount of damages. Having
failed to object to the omission of a statement of the amount of special
damages, he has waived it.15
CharlesE. Goss
35

Lexington &E. Ry. Co. v. Fields, 152 Ky. 19, 22, 153 S.W. 43, 45 (1913).

